




















This document has been approved for public





ttVAL PCS GRADUATE SCHQQfc
•4C




Major, United States Army
B.S., Texas Technological College, 1960
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





Soldiers wearing chemical-biological (CB) protective uniforms
experience heat stress and may become heat casualties. Current defensive
doctrine suggests that commanders may reduce the risk of heat casualties
by rotating their troops through varying degrees of protection. Since
unprotected troops will become CB casualties if an attack occurs, the
commander must trade risk of heat casualties for risk of CB casualties.
The effects of temperature and work rate on the buildup of heat in pro-
tected soldiers are examined. The problem facing the commander is
formulated as a queueing theory problem and a computer simulation used
to obtain a solution. Graphs show the percent of unprotected personnel
within a unit necessary to prevent heat casualties for a range of tempera-
tures and unit work rates.
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1 J Statement of the Problem
Modern chemical and biological weapons systems present an
extreme hazard to troops operating on the battlefield of the future.
The characteristics of these weapons are such that personnel may not
even be aware that they are being attacked until casualties occur.
Therefore defensive policies require that commanders take steps to
protect their personnel before an attack or when an attack appears
imminent. Such policies demand a high degree of chemical and biologi-
cal (CB) defensive readiness when the intelligence situation indicates
enemy use of CB weapons is probable. Since defensive measures include
wearing of protective uniforms by troops, commanders are faced by a
serious dilemma. This dilemma occurs because wearing the CB protective
uniform results in heat stress to the protected individuals.
Current defensive policies suggest that a commander may overcome
his problem by adopting various levels of protection within his unit or
by mixing the degree of protection that he prescribes to his unit. How-
ever, s/ery little guidance is available to help the troop commander
decide what portion of his unit should be highly protected and what
portion should be less protected.
The purpose of this work is to provide quantitative guidance for
two defensive policies available to a commander. Heat stress relation-
ships and the principles of queueing theory are used to determine how
many persons must remain unprotected at all times if heat casualties are
to be minimized. The number of protected and unprotected personnel
necessary to prevent heat casualties is calculated for different climatic
conditions and for different work levels. Based on the results
obtained here a commander can evaluate the feasibility of these two
defensive plans for his unit's operations. A plan which requires more
unprotected personnel than the unit could afford to lose from CB
casualties should not be implemented.
1.2 Background
When the use of chemical agents was initiated during World
War I, units were immediately aware when they came under a chemical
attack. Chemical agents of that time, such as chlorine, phosgene, and
mustard gases, were readily identifiable by their odor or visibility.
Units could take necessary protective measures when and only when they
came under attack. However, the current arsenal of chemical weapons
does not generally provide any sensory warning. For example, the
majority of nerve agents are colorless and odorless. Furthermore, these
agents are lethal in such small quantities that fatal dosages may enter
the body of an individual without his knowledge. The threat of such
weapons together with that of biological agents, which cannot be detected
by the human senses, requires either prior warning of an attack or some
degree of protection at all times to minimize casualties.
Chemical and biological protective uniforms are available which
act as a barrier against penetration of CB agents to the soldier's body.
(4)
The standard uniform, according to the Department of the Army, consists
of a protective mask and hood, specially treated boots, and chemical
protective clothing outfit. This latter ensemble consists of trouser
and shirt liners, socks, and gloves which have been chemically treated
to prevent penetration of CB agents. This uniform will be issued to
troops operating behind the brigade rear boundary. Troops forward of
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this area will receive a two piece overgarment now under development
for protection. These uniforms, while providing the necessary protection
against toxic agents, also restrict the release of heat from the body of
protected personnel. Data on the heat transfer capability of the
(3)
standard uniform is given by Cresthulr . The failure of CB protec-
tive uniforms to liberate all heat generated by the soldier limits
activity and the time the uniform may be worn. Heat buildup in the
soldier's body can produce heat prostration or heat stroke.
The oroblem of heat stress among soldiers wearing the CB protective
(6)
uniform has been studied by Goldman and Cresthull. Goldman v ' considered
the allowable working times of protected troops wearing the now Standard
B (limited usability) protective uniform. This uniform consisted of
normal field clothing impregnated with chemical compounds and was more
resistant to heat transfer than the current uniform considered here.
Dr. Goldman asserts that only minor heat stress problems will occur
below effective temperatures of 70 degrees, and he gives predicted work-
ing times until a unit will have 50% heat casualties at temperatures
(3)
from 60 to 100 degrees. Cresthull v ' examined the heat transfer capa-
bilities of various protective uniforms and determined allowable safe
working times for protected personnel. His work also considered what
percent of each hour soldiers in protective uniforms could conduct
light, moderate, or heavy work and still maintain heat equilibrium.
These papers tell how long an individual can wear the CB protective
uniform without becoming a heat casualty. However, more important to a
commander in the field might be the questions of how long will it be
necessary for each individual to wear the uniform, and can he wear it
that period of time without becoming a heat casualty?
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Current concepts of individual CB protective policy realize
that all unit personnel cannot safely wear protective clothing at all
(4)
times. Defensive doctrine as set forth by Department of Army v '
establishes three levels of Mission Oriented Protective Posture. The
minimum level of protective posture calls for soldiers to wear the
normal duty uniform and carry their protective masks, hoods, and gloves.
At a medium level posture, troops should wear protective uniforms but
carry masks, hoods, and gloves. The maximum level of posture consists
of troops fully dressed in all items of the CB protective uniform.
Commanders are charged with the responsibility of selecting the level
of Mission Oriented Protective Posture applicable to their unit's opera-
tions. It is suggested that a commander may reduce the hazards of heat
stress by mixing the levels of protective posture among members of his
unit or by rotating troops to different levels of Mission Oriented
Protective Posture in order to provide a relief from the buildup of
body heat.
1,3 Scope
This paper is concerned with the aspects of this latter idea.
Is it feasible for the commander to rotate his personnel through various
levels of protective posture? Given the allowable time an individual
can wear the CB protective uniform, how many personnel should be at the
minimum level of protective posture to prevent heat casualties in the
unit? Chapter II considers two possible options available to the com-
mander and the heat stress considerations of each. Chapter III discusses
a model which was used to determine the number of unprotected personnel
necessary to prevent heat casualties. Chapter IV presents results
obtained from the use of this model considering various unit work levels
12
and climatic conditions. The methodology and results of this thesis
make possible more quantitative guidance to commanders faced with the
problem of establishing CB defensive postures for their units.
13
CHAPTER II
HEAT STRESS ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM
2.1 Command Considerations
The chief concerns of any commander must be the accomplishment
of his mission and the welfare of his personnel. The ideal CB defen-
sive policy would provide a minimum reduction in unit effectiveness
while insuring low risks to personnel from either heat stress or CB
weapons. Rotating unit personnel to different levels of Mission
Oriented Protective Posture as suggested in (4) may give a commander
his best opportunity to maximize his unit's effectiveness without
extreme risks of casualties. Since toxic attacks will likely be
undetectable by the human senses, CB casualties can be minimized by
giving maximum protection to the largest number of personnel possible.
It is probable that all unprotected personnel will be casualties. Hence
rational defensive policies call for the highest possible number of
troops, commensurate with heat stress conditions, to be in full protec-
tive uniform. These protected personnel will be accumulating body heat
according to their work level and climatic conditions. The remaining
unprotected troops would be dissipating the heat loads they had accumu-
lated while wearing the uniform.
Two defensive policies for implementing rotation of troops
between protective postures are considered here. Both plans call for
as many troops to receive full protection as heat stress conditions will
allow. The two alternatives arise from two options the commander has on
how the unprotected troops will cool themselves. One alternative would
arise from a commander's desire to maintain full effectiveness of his
unit. Unprotected personnel would work at the same energy level as
14
protected personnel. Heat dissipation would be relatively slow, but
unit effectiveness would remain high. The other possible option would
be for unprotected personnel to perform their same duties but at
reduced energy levels, thereby speeding the cooling operation. This
reduced work level would result in lower unit effectiveness. Regardless
of whether the commander attempts to maintain effectiveness with the
former option or accepts reduced work rates with the latter, he is faced
with the problem of trading risk of chemical-biological casualties for
risk of heat casualties. Therefore commanders need quantitative guidance
for their decision making. Information available in this thesis allows
commanders to determine the number of troops which must remain unpro-
tected and vulnerable to CB attack in order to prevent heat casualties
within his unit. The remainder of this chapter discusses the factors
which must be considered in evaluating the heat stress which will occur
in units protected from CB agents. These considerations will be used in
Chapter III to formulate a queueing theory model for solution of the
problem.
2,2 Heat Stress Considerations
(1
)
According to Belding and Hatclv , heat stress occurs when an
individual produces more body heat than he can release into the sur-
rounding environment by evaporation. Heat loss by evaporation is depen-
dent on radiation and convection heat loss and the individual's
metabolic heat load. Their work provides a detailed explanation of
methods for determining heat loads, and its concepts served as a basis
for all heat stress calculations of this paper. Personnel wearing the
full CB protective uniforms are severely restricted in the amounts of
heat that they can release. Evaluation of the heat load which will be
15
accumulated by troops requires the knowledge of three factors: climatic
conditions, heat loss capabilities of personnel in protective uniforms,
and metabolic heat production rate.
2.3 Climate Considerations
The factors of weather which affect heat stress calculations
include the temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, and solar heat
load. The joint effects of these factors may be stated in terms of the
Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT) index. This method of stating
effective temperatures is well known by military personnel and is
described in TB Med 175 v . According to Goldman^ ' there should be
few heat stress problems below effective temperatures of 70 WBGT.
Effective temperatures from 50 to 100 WBGT were studied here.
2.4 Considerations of Heat Loss in Protective Uniforms
The maximum hourly heat loss of individuals wearing protective
(3)
uniforms is a function of the effective temperature. Cresthull v ' pre-
sents heat loss data for a wide variety of uniforms. Using his data,
equations for maximum hourly heat loss were obtained. Troops wearing
the standard protective uniform described in paragraph 1.2 with masks,
hoods, and gloves have a heat loss rate, L, given by
L = 3,5(127-WBGT). (1)
The heat loss rate for individuals wearing the normal fatigue field
uniform without mask, hood, and gloves is
L = 3.84(172-WBGT). (2)
16
Therefore personnel who are maintaining maximum Mission Oriented
Protective Posture will have heat loss rates given by equation (1),
and those at a minimum posture will lose heat according to equation (2).
2.5 Heat Production Considerations
Since the CB protective uniform reduces the amount of heat its
wearer may liberate to the environment, a portion of the metabolic
heat produced is stored in the body. The rate at which troops work
is therefore an important factor in determining how long they may safely
wear the protective uniform. Work at high energy levels may in fact
produce more metabolic heat than can be liberated even in normal fatigue
uniforms. Estimates of the heat produced at various energy levels are
given by Bel ding and Hatch * ' as follows:
Light Work 100-150 Kcal/hr.
Moderate Work 150-300 Kcal/hr.
Heavy Work 300-550 Kcal/hr.
These estimates apply for a 154 pound man and will vary depending on
the physical characteristics of personnel. Light work may include
activities such as desk work, operating sighting mechanisms, or driving
a vehicle. Moderate work is represented by heavy arm and leg movements
or moderate lifting and pushing. Pick and shovel work or loading and
stacking ammunition are examples of heavy work.
One obstacle in determining the heat casualty hazard to an
entire unit of troops arises from the wide range of activities occur-
ring within the unit. Radio-telephone operators may be performing light
work at the same time that other soldiers are digging field fortifica-
tions. However, heat stress calculations for the entire unit may be
17
made by finding an effective metabolic heat production rate, For the
purposes of this paper, the mathematical expectation of the unit's work
is used.
For example, if an artillery battery conducting a fire mission
has 30% of its personnel performing light work, 46% moderate work, and
24% heavy work, its effective heat production rate, P, is
P = ,3(150) + .46(300) + ,24(550) = 315 Kcal/hr.
Knowledge of a unit's table of organization and the duties performed
by its personnel will allow calculation of an effective work rate for
a variety of unit missions.
2,6 Prevention of Heat Casualties
(3)
According to Cresthulr ' the probability of heat casualties in
soldiers who have stored a heat load of 160 Kcal . is 0.5, For individ-
uals with a stored heat load of 80 Kcal. the probability of heat casual-
ties is zero. Therefore a chemical -biological defensive policy which
attempts to minimize heat casualties should offer high probability
that stored heat loads do not exceed 80 Kcal. Ideally, individuals who
have stored 80 Kcal, should be allowed to remove the uniform immediately
and remain unprotected until they have dissipated their stored heat load.
However, such a strict policy would likely be impossible to implement
under field conditions. In order to establish a reasonable defensive
policy for use in this thesis, Cresthull's data was analyzed to determine
a plan which gave low probability of heat casualties. A defensive policy
offering 95% assurance that individuals will wait less than 15 minutes
to remove the protective uniform (after storing 80 Kcal.) provides an
acceptable and real world risk of heat casualties.
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2.7 Calculation of Unit Cooling Requirements
The number of persons within a unit wearing protective uniforms
who will reach a stored heat load of 80 kcal . during a given time period
is a random variable. Values which the random variable assumes are
dependent on the unit's effective heat production rate and the effective
temperature. The average rate at which personnel reach 80 Kcal., i.e.,
the mean of the random variable, may be calculated as follows. Consider
a 100 man unit working in the CB Protective uniform. Let
X = average number of persons who reach 80 Kcal. in an hour
P = effective heat production rate, Kcal/man/hr.
L = heat loss rate, Kcal/man/hr.
Then
X
(100 men)(P - L) Kcal/man/hr
80 Kcal /person
X = 1.25 (P - L) persons/hour. (3)
For a given effective temperature (WBGT) the value of L is found by
equation (1). The effective heat production rate is calculated as
discussed in paragraph 2.5. A commander's defensive system should be
capable of accomodating cooling requirements which occur at a mean rate
given by equation (3).
2.8 Calculation of Cooling Times
Also of importance in determining how to mix levels of protective
posture within a unit is the time required for individuals to completely
dissipate an 80 Kcal. heat load, This time is also a random variable
dependent on work rate and effective temperature. The mean value of the
cooling time may be calculated by determining the heat loss potential of
cooling individuals. If troops remove their protective uniforms and
continue to work at their previous work rate, then the mean cooling







where P is the effective heat production rate and L is the heat loss
potential of the normal fatigue uniform given by equation (2). If in
addition to removing the protective uniform, troops are allowed to
reduce their heat production rate to a lower level while cooling, then
the heat loss potential of all cooling personnel will be the same. If
the work rate of all cooling personnel was reduced to 150 Kcal/hr, for
example, cooling time becomes a constant whose value is given by
equation (4) with P equal to 150 Kcal/hr.
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CHAPTER III
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
3.1 An Approach to the Problem
Using the information and relationships discussed in the
preceeding chapter and the concepts of queueing theory, it is possible
to obtain results of value to a commander who must formulate chemical -
biological defensive policies. Results can be found which show what
percent of a unit must remain unprotected from CB attack if low proba-
bility of heat casualties is desired. This percent of the unit which
must remain vulnerable to attack is determined for a range of temperatures
and unit effective heat production rates. The physical situation con-
fronting a commander lends itself to formulation as a problem of queueing
theory.
If we consider the dissipation of a stored heat load as a service
provided to the individual, unprotected personnel cooling themselves
become customers receiving a service at a cooling-service facility. Pro-
tected personnel may be considered as a population, each member of which
will sooner or later demand cooling service at the facility. The fact
that this service facility has no physical characteristics such as
location or human serving attendants in no way violates the concepts of
queueing theory. The number of service channels, i.e., servers, available
at the facility is the number of individuals the commander authorizes to
remain unprotected. Thus in deciding how many troops to risk as CB
casualties, he fixes the number of servers. If he orders twenty soldiers
to remain unprotected at all times for cobling purposes, the number of
servers will be twenty. Service time (i.e., cooling time) is a random
variable which depends on effective temperature and work rate as discussed
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in paragraph 2.8. Personnel accumulate 80 Kcal , heat load at a mean
rate which is determined as outlined in paragraph 2.7 and then become
a customer demanding cooling service.
Customers who require cooling service when all of the service
channels are busy enter a queue and wait until a server becomes free.
When a cooling soldier has lost his heat load, he then puts on a pro-
tective uniform and frees a theoretical service channel, which is then
taken by the first soldier waiting in the queue. This latter soldier
then initiates his cooling service by removing his protective uniform.
For a fixed temperature, work rate, and number of servers, it is
possible to determine the queueing time for individuals passing through
the system. If for a given set of conditions, 95% of the customers
wait for less than 15 minutes in the queue, then the defensive policy
associated with these conditions is acceptable as discussed in para-
graph 2.6. If on the other hand, large numbers of persons wait over
15 minutes, the commander should authorize more servers, i.e., unpro-
tected soldiers, to prevent heat casualties. Hence this model makes it
possible to determine how many unprotected personnel must be risked as
CB casualties to prevent heat casualties at a given temperature and heat
production rate. If this number of casualties risked is greater than
the unit could accept and still perform its mission, then mixing levels
of protective posture is not a feasible defensive policy for the commander
to establish.
3.2 Assumptions
To obtain a solution to this queueing problem several assumptions
must be made. The first assumption is that demands for cooling service
occur according to a Poisson probability distribution with mean arrival
22
(2)
rate given by equation (3). According to Cox v ; this is likely to be a
particularly good approximation if persons arriving for service come
from a large population all behaving independently of one another. It
appears reasonable in this case to assume that heat buildup in a
soldier is independent of that in his comrades. Furthermore the number
of arrivals in any time interval should be proportional to the length
of the interval and independent of the number of arrivals in any other
equal, non-overlapping interval. Hence there seems to be no violation
of the necessary conditions for assuming a Poisson distribution.
The second assumption made is that service time has an Erlang
distribution with mean service time given by equation (4). Hillier and
Lieberman^ state the Erlang distribution is yery useful for approxi-
mating empirical service time distributions. Its probability distribution
function,
f(t) ={^r tk-Vkut j,k>o (5)
offers the capability of tailoring the distribution by varying the two
parameters, u and k. There is strong intuitive appeal to the assumption
that the service time distribution in this problem should have the general
form of Figure 1. It is reasonable that the majority of service times
will be relatively close to the mean time with small probability of
extremely long or short service times. The mean cooling time is calcu-
lated from equation (4). Various combinations of the parameters were
considered, and it was determined that the equation
f ( t ) = LtyL tV4ut (6)
where u is the reciprocal of the mean cooling time, gave cooling times













cooling time is 25 minutes, the probability is 0.8 that the cooling
time is greater than ten minutes and less than forty minutes. Therefore
it was assumed that service time has an Erlang distribution with k = 4.
A final assumption is that it is possible to determine the heat
load of an individual, It is assumed that soldiers know when their
cooling service is finished or when they should demand cooling service.
This is a condition which admittedly would be difficult or impractical
to achieve in an actual field situation. However, the purpose of this
paper is not to prescribe a plan for field implementation but to obtain
quantitative information to assist a commander in establishing policy.
3.3 Considerations of the Queueing Problem
The problem has now been reduced to finding the queueing time
distribution of a queueing system with Poisson arrivals, Erlang service
times, and m servers. The number of servers necessary to insure a
probability of 0.95 that queueing time is less than 15 minutes must be
found for pertinent combinations of temperature and work rate. Solution
of this type queueing system for the distribution of queueing time is
(9)discussed by Saaty. He obtains a solution in terms of an unknown
constant, and recommends experiments or other approaches to obtain the
needed constant. Since information is not available to obtain an
analytic solution, methods for solution by Monte Carlo techniques were
adopted.
3.4 Description of the Computer Simulation
The International Business Machine Corporation's General Purpose
Simulation System (GPSS) was used to simulate the queueing system.
Details on the use of this simulation system are available in IBM's
(8)
User Manual/ ; The GPSS program allows the user to simulate queueing
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situations by generating demands for service which move through functional
blocks portraying the physical characteristics of the system. The demands,
called transactions, are initiated through the use of a random number
generator and a probability distribution function established by the
user. Transactions move through the simulated system, entering service
facilities if they are free or joining waiting lines if they are not.
Service facilities which have multiple servers are called storages. The
user establishes the number of servers by means of a storage identifica-
tion card which gives the capacity of the storage. Transactions which
try to enter a full storage are sent to a queue until a vacancy exists.
Queueing statistics are compiled for each transaction such as its time
to transit the system, time spent queueing, and its service time. Other
useful values are accumulated for queues and service facilities such as
average contents, maximum contents, and average times spent by trans-
actions in queues and service.
The flow chart of the computer simulation used is shown in
Figure 2 and a sample program is in Appendix A. Block 1 calls for the
generation of transactions having exponentially distributed inter-
arrival times with a mean of A. This gives the Poisson distributed
cooling demands required for this problem. The value of A is the recip-
rocal of the mean number of arrivals calculated by equation (3). The
second block tells the transaction to go to Queue 1. If the queue is
empty, the transaction attempts to go to the next block; if not it
joins the waiting line. The third block instructs the transaction to
enter the cooling-service facility, called COOL. If the facility is
presently full, Block 3 will cause the transaction to remain in queue































Figure 2. Simulation Flow Chart
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Block 4 removes the transaction from the queue and information such as
how long the transaction was in the queue is tabulated.
Block 5 provides the mechanism for simulating service time.
This block holds the transaction for a period of time specified by the
user. As shown, the service time will have an Erlang distribution with
mean B. The value of B is calculated by equation (4). The program
obtains service times from a random number generator and the proba-
bility distribution given by the user. If constant service times are
desired, the function is eliminated, and the constant value only given.
Transactions enter Block 6 after their service time is finished. This
block registers a vacancy in COOL which can now be filled from the
queue. Block 7 causes tabulation of service time data. Block 8 removes
the transaction from the system and increments a counter. The simu-
lation continues until the counter registers the number of transactions
specified by the user and then stops. Program output includes the
following information:
1. Maximum and average contents of service facility
2. Average service time
3. Frequency table of the number of service times
falling in given time intervals. (In this case
15 minute time intervals were used.)
4. Maximum and average contents of the queue
5. Number of transactions with zero waiting time
6. Average queueing time
7. Frequency table of the number of queueing times
falling in given time intervals. (15 minute
intervals were used.)
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3.5 Simulation Input Requirements
To conduct one simulation of the queueing system for a given
temperature and work rate the following steps were taken. First the
mean time between arrivals was calculated by taking the reciprocal of
the mean demand rate of equation (3). This value was entered by a
GENERATE instruction card. The next step required preparation of
input cards which defined the service time distribution function.
These identifier cards give an argument and the value of the cumula-
tive distribution function at that argument. The program used to
calculate these values for an Erlang distribution of order four is in
Appendix B. The mean service time was calculated from equation (4).
Finally a STORAGE definition card was entered which established the
number of servers at the service facility for this iteration of the
program. The simulation was initiated by a START card which specified
the number of transactions which must enter the termination block before
the simulation stops.
3.6 Solution Procedure
Solution of the queueing problem for the number of servers
which gave 95% assurance that the queueing time of individuals was
less than 15 minutes was an iterative procedure. For a given work
rate and effective temperature the input requirements discussed above
were calculated. A number of servers for the service facility was
assumed, and the simulation for those conditions was completed. Then
the output data was examined to see if the criterion discussed in
paragraph 2.6 for an acceptable defensive policy had been satisfied.
If the results showed that more than 5% of the transactions had queue-
ing times that were greater than 15 minutes, the number of servers was
29
increased and the simulation repeated. If the number of transactions
with queueing times greater than 15 minutes was less than 5%, results
with fewer servers were examined. This procedure was repeated until
the smallest number of servers which gave queueing times of less than
15 minutes to 95% of the transactions was obtained. Results of the




4.1 Results for Constant Cooling Times
One of the two defensive policies discussed in paragraph 2.1
called for personnel who remove the protective uniform for cooling
service to also reduce their work rate. This plan, while reducing
the unit's effectiveness, should also reduce cooling time. To obtain
solutions for this defensive policy all personnel were considered to
reduce activity to a light work rate of 150 Kcal/hr. while receiving
cooling service. In this situation service time would be constant
for all services given. The simulation for this defensive plan was
based on a unit consisting of 100 soldiers, and hence the acceptable
number of servers converted directly to percent unprotected personnel.
Solutions were obtained from the simulation for effective temperatures
ranging from 50 to 100 degrees WBGT. Unit expected heat production
rates of 200, 300, 400, and 500 Kcal/hr. were considered. The results
of the simulation are shown in Tables I through IV. Figure 3 is a graph
showing the percent of the unit which must be unprotected to prevent
heat casualties versus effective temperature.
Using Figure 3 a commander can evaluate the feasibility of this
defensive plan for his unit. Suppose a commander estimated the effective
heat production rate of his unit was 200 Kcal/hr. If he was operating
in an effective temperature of 70 degrees WBGT, Figure 3 shows that 12%
of his troops must remain unprotected for cooling in order to prevent
heat casualties. If the commander feels that he can accept the risk of
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On the other hand, if his unit's effective heat production rate was
300 instead of 200 Kcal/hr., the graph indicates 50% of his unit must
remain unprotected. In this case the plan would most likely be rejected
as infeasible since now half of the troops are vulnerable to CB attack.
4.2 Results for Variable Cooling Times
The other defensive plan discussed in paragraph 2.1 attempts
to maintain unit effectiveness by having all personnel work at their
normal work rates. When the time arrives for a soldier to dissipate
his heat load, he removes the protective uniform but continues his same
work rate in the normal fatigue uniform. Consequently, the metabolic
heat production rate of cooling personnel is the same as that of the
rest of the unit's troops. This results in the cooling times being a
random variable, which was assumed to have an Erlang distribution. Unit
effectiveness remains unchanged, but cooling service times are increased
for this defensive policy. As in the previous case with constant cooling
times, solutions were obtained by simulation for work rates of 200, 300,
400, and 500 Kcal/hr. Results for 200 and 300 Kcal/hr. rates are given
in Tables V and VI. All results for 400 and 500 Kcal/hr. showed that
100% of the unit must be unprotected. Also at these high work rates
heat buildup can occur in the fatigue uniform. Figure 4 is a graph of
necessary percent of personnel unprotected versus the effective temperature
The results for both constant and variable cooling times are
conservative values for the percent of persons which must remain unpro-
tected to prevent heat casualties. As such they may present a pessimis-
tic picture of the actual cooling requirements which will exist in actual
field situations. This is true because a constant mean rate of cooling
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is not completely realistic since the mean rate of cooling demands will
decrease as more and more soldiers enter the cooling facility and are
therefore not available to create new demands on the system. Sensi-
tivity analyses, which are discussed in the next section, were conducted
to determine the effects of errors in demand rate and other simulation
parameters. It appears that this lack of realism assumes importance only
at high temperatures and work rates where the number of unprotected per-
sonnel is extremely high. Under such conditions small variations in the
number of unprotected personnel will not greatly influence the commander's
decisions.
4.3 Stability and Sensitivity Analyses
Each solution obtained for the various temperatures and work
rates was based on results of the computer simulation representing 500
transits of the queueing system. Since the demand rate and the service
times varied between iterations of the simulation, the real times repre-
sented by 500 transactions varied widely, The average time represented
by 500 transactions was 11,5 hours of operation of the queueing system.
A stability analysis was made to determine the effect of the number of
transactions on the results. Results from simulations using 1000 and
5000 transactions varied less than 3% with those using 500 transactions.
Hence it appeared steady-state results were obtained from 500 trans-
actions, and this value was used for all solutions.
Sensitivity analyses were also conducted to determine the effects
of changes in mean demand rate for cooling and mean service time on
solutions. Changes of 10% in the mean demand rate for cooling produced
an average change of 14% in the number of unprotected personnel. When
10% variations in the mean cooling times were introduced, results varied





Modern chemical -biological (CB) weapons systems will produce
high casualties among unprotected troops. Defensive policies require
commanders to protect their personnel when CB attacks are imminent.
Protective measures include wearing protective uniforms which cause
heat buildup in the wearer's body. This heat stress presents the
threat of heat casualties among protected personnel. Current defen-
sive doctrine suggests this threat may be reduced by rotating troops
through various degrees of protection. Some portion of a unit may be
protected and storing a heat load, while the remainder is unprotected
and dissipating their stored heat load. Two defensive policies are
examined to determine how many troops must remain unprotected and cooling
in order to prevent heat casualties.
Heat buildup in soldiers wearing the protective uniform depends
on weather conditions and the soldiers' metabolic heat production rate.
Heat transfer capabilities of the protective uniform may be calculated
for given effective temperatures (WBGT). How often a soldier will
require cooling can be determined from his heat storage rate, i.e., heat
produced minus heat lost. Cooling requirements for an entire unit may
be made by calculating the unit's effective heat production rate. Individ-
uals within the unit should begin cooling themselves as soon as their
stored heat load equals 80 Kcal . to prevent heat casualties. A defensive
policy offering 95% assurance that soldiers wait less than fifteen minutes
to begin cooling provides an acceptable risk of heat casualties.
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Knowledge of the unit's effective heat production rate and the
effective temperature can be used to calculate the average number of
requirements for cooling the unit can expect per hour. Likewise it is
possible to calculate how long soldiers will require to dissipate their
heat load. Using this information and the concepts of queueing theory,
results showing how many troops must remain unprotected at all times
to prevent heat casualties were obtained. Soldiers who are unprotected
are considered to be customers receiving cooling service from a capacity-
limited service facility. Protected soldiers will demand service as
soon as they store 80 Kcal . The capacity, i.e., number of servers, of
the service facility is determined by the number of unprotected soldiers
the commander authorizes,
Personnel who require cooling service when the service facility
is filled join a queue. If the queueing time of at least 95% of the
persons who must wait is less than 15 minutes, the authorized number of
unprotected soldiers is adequate. Demands for cooling are assumed to
arrive according to a Poisson probability distribution. Cooling
service times are assumed to be Erlang distributed. Solution for the
required number of unprotected personnel to prevent heat casualties is
obtained by solving the queueing system for the number of servers
necessary to insure a 0.95 probability that queueing time is less than
15 minutes. A computer simulation was used to solve the problem for
temperatures of 50 to 100 degrees (WBGT) and unit effective heat produc-
tion rates of 200, 300, 400, and 500 Kcal/hr. Graphs showing the
required percent of unprotected personnel (number of servers) versus
effective temperatures are used to present results. Commanders may
then determine how many unprotected troops they must risk as chemical
-
biological casualties if they wish to reduce the threat of heat casualties
by rotating their personnel through various degrees of protection.
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5.2 Conclusions
The results of this work give commanders quantitative guidance
in implementing current suggested chemical -biological defensive policy.
The commander, who wishes to minimize the danger of heat casualties by
rotating his personnel through different levels of Mission Oriented
Protective Posture, can see the risks involved. He can see if the
number of unprotected personnel necessary to prevent heat casualties
exceeds the CB casualties he could accept and still accomplish his
mission. The results show that in most cases the risk of CB casualties
must be high in order to provide an acceptable risk of heat casualties.
Thus the feasibility of the whole concept of Mission Oriented Protec-
tive Posture is suspect if judged solely on its capability to minimize
heat casualties.
Perhaps more important than the actual results obtained is the
methodology developed here. Previous work has considered the length
of time individuals can tolerate the protective uniform. Use of the
procedures developed here can provide more definitive guidance to
commanders on how these tolerable time limits satisfy requirements of
operations in the field.
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DO 3 1=1, NUM
READ 2, YMU( I)
2 FORMAT (FIT. 3)
3 CONTINUE
DO 5 1=1, NUM



















21 FORMAT <//,5X.«MU = «,F10.C,//)
DO 30 I=1.INA
PRINT 22, AlIliBIII













3. Professor Gary K. Poock (Thesis Advisor) 1
Department of Operations Analysis
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Operations Analysis Department 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Mr. Ula J. Jones 1
Chemical, Biological, Radiological Defense Branch
U. S. Army Chemical Center and School
Fort McClellan, Alabama 36201
6. MAJ John F. Henry, USA 1





DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA -R&D
(Security classification o( title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)
I. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
26. GROUP
3- REPO RT TITLE
GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS IN ESTABLISHING CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL DEFENSIVE POLICIES
A. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and.inclusive dates)
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)
John F. Henry
5. REPOR T DATE
December 1968
7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES
48
lb. NO. OF REFS
la. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.
b. PROJ EC T NO.
9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBERIS)





umb&rs that may be assigned
\^~ •\k\^
10. DISTRI BUTION SItatement j|q j r r\ n ru j ii iM n^ftfl fl
n
|?i J
^-LfO^r c pft pjj n 1 P'i'pfLLi . mw»hii1i. , i riTT~TT i r h
f-ranomi±-t
n 1
tn fnmninn ym rPvnmm n t r^vr&Rrftipn national <; may ha maHp fttOy uith prio r
approvfrr-^ £--tbc -T5Trrprint Q n iirn t, Na«u1 P<j ikjMi l iMl ig=^hnn! ^jyipptoroy raiife
It. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. ABSTR AC T
Soldiers wearing chemical-biological (CB) protective uniforms experience
heat stress and may become heat casualties. Current defensive doctrine suggests
that commanders may reduce the risk of heat casualties by rotating their troops
through varying decrees of protection. Since unprotected troops will become CB
casualties if an attack occurs, the commander must trade risk of heat casualties
for risk of CB casualties. The effects of temperature and work rate on the buildup
of heat in protected soldiers are examined. The problem facing the commander is
formulated as a queueing theory problem and a computer simulation used to obtain
a solution. Graphs show the percent of unprotected personnel within a unit necessary
to prevent heat casualties for a range of temperatures and unit work rates.
)D FORMI NOV 65
/N 01 01 -807-681
1
























^^S Syracuse, N. Y,
^^^ StocMon, Calif.
thesH466
Guidance for commanders in establishing
3 2768 000 99217 6
^ DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
